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Section 309(c) of the Clean Water Act:
Using the Model Penal Code to Clarify
Mental State in Water Pollution Crimes
ANDREW C. HANSON*
I. Introduction
Courts and commentators have struggled with interpreting
the mental state requirement in modern regulatory criminal stat-
utes, and the public welfare offense doctrine has been the focus of
that confusion.1 Although the doctrine was first recognized by
Professor Francis Sayre in 1933 as a growing trend in courts to
dispense with mental state in so-called "petty offenses," 2 the Su-
preme Court has defined public welfare offenses as those which a
reasonable person would know are subject to strict public regula-
tion and could threaten public health and safety.3 Further, the
Supreme Court recently clarified that public welfare offense stat-
utes regulate activities that are both "dangerous" and "uncom-
mon."4 No longer limited to "petty offenses," it has been a
tortuous journey for the public welfare offense doctrine since the
days of Professor Sayre. 5
Most commentary on federal environmental crimes attempts
to address the normative inquiry of whether an activity should or
should not fall analytically within the ambit of the public welfare
* Equal Justice Works Fellow, Midwest Environmental Advocates, Inc.; J.D.,
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, 2001. The author wishes to
thank Professor Susan Mandiberg of the Northwestern School of Law for her open
door, helpful guidance and thoughtful criticism in completing this article.
1. See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999) (arguing in
general that the Court should not apply the public welfare offense doctrine to federal
regulatory crimes); Stuart P. Green, Why It's A Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J.
1533 (1997) (arguing that intentional disobedience of government authority is morally
wrongful and justifies application of the public welfare offense doctrine).
2. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
3. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1985); see also discussion
infra Section 1II.B.2).
4. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1994).
5. See infra Section III.B.3.
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offense doctrine.6 Despite the struggle with answering that ques-
tion, few commentators have suggested abandoning the public
welfare offense doctrine altogether as an interpretative tool and
replacing it with a more structured scheme.7 Such a scheme would
not necessarily answer the normative question of whether certain
acts should or should not be made criminal. That question is for
Congress to answer. Instead, a more structured approach would
address at least one source of the controversy: whether a mental
state requirement applies at all, and if so, to which acts and at-
tendant circumstances declared in the statute. Enter the Model
Penal Code (MPC).
6. See, e.g., M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration of Scienter Under
Environmental Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 105, 143-48 (1992) (arguing
that the public welfare offense doctrine should not apply environmental crimes such
as those enumerated in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, Clean Air Act, and Endangered Species Act because, unlike traditional
public welfare offenses, they carry heavy penalties); David Gerger, Environmental
Crime, CHAMPION, Oct. 2000, at 34 (arguing the complexity of environmental laws
mitigates against application of the public welfare offense doctrine); Robert A. Milne,
Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict
Criminal Liability In Substance But Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 307, 330-32 (1989)
(arguing that application of the public offense doctrine to environmental statutes
means they are treated as strict liability statutes); Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability
Matter?: Statutory Construction Under 42 U.S.C. § 6928, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 222
(1993); Stanley A Twardy, Jr. & Michael G. Considine, What Must One "Know" To Be
Convicted Under the Environmental Laws?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1997, at
48; Dennis Jenkins, Comment, Criminal Prosecution and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act: An Analysis of the Constitution and Criminal Intent in an Environmental Con-
text, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 595 (1997); Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Envi-
ronmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 861 (1996); John D. Copeland, The Criminalization of Environmental Law: Im-
plications for Agriculture, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 237 (1995); Andrew J. Turner, Mens Rea
in Environmental Crime Prosecutions: Ignorantia Juris and the White Collar Crimi-
nal, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1998).
7. At least one author has suggested that Congress should adopt a uniform cul-
pability provision that would apply to all federal crimes. See Vitiello supra note 6, at
247-51. Another author has suggested a clearer scheme for interpreting mental state
in federal environmental crimes. See Rebecca S. Weber, Comment, Element Analysis
Applied to Environmental Crimes: What Did They Know, and When Did They Know
It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 53 (1988). Although both authors suggest that the
Model Penal Code interpretative protocols would be helpful to clarifying mental state
in federal regulatory crimes, neither recognizes that Congress has drafted federal
criminal statutes using common law techniques. As a result, to make the MPC's defi-
nitions and interpretative protocols workable, Congress would have to redraft the
statute according to those definitions and protocols. See Susan F. Mandiberg, The
Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example,
25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1236-37 (1995).
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The Clean Water Act's criminal statute, section 309(c),8 pro-
vides a suitable vehicle for exploring what effect the MPC's defini-
tions and interpretative protocols might have on mental state in
water pollution crimes. Section 309(c)(2) prohibits "knowing" vio-
lations of various sections of the Act, most notably the require-
ment to comply with conditions in a pollutant discharge permit.9
Controversy surrounds whether section 309(c) should be consid-
ered a public welfare offense statute. Early courts interpreting
section 309(c)'s predecessor in section 407 of the Refuse Act of
189910 held that water pollution crimes are public welfare of-
fenses, 1 arguably applying Professor Sayre's concept of the
term.12 Courts and commentators interpreting section 309(c)(2)
of the Clean Water Act today, however, have struggled with the
Supreme Court's modern formulation of the public welfare offense
doctrine. Some argue that water pollution is not a public welfare
offense and therefore that "knowing" relates to defendant's aware-
ness of the law that he has just broken. 13 Others argue that the
public welfare offense doctrine does apply, and "knowing" means a
knowing act that results in a violation of the law. 14 As drafted,
the statute is arguably ambiguous.1 5 Given the controversy, there
8. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000). Specifically, section 309(c)(2)(A)
provides:
(2) Knowing violations. Any person who-
knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328,
or 1345 of this title [sections 311, 312, 316, 318, 311(b)(3), 318, or 405], or
any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a
permit issued under section 1342 [402] of this title by the Administrator
or by a State, or any requirement imposed in a pretreatment program
approved under section 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8) [section 402(a)(3) or
402(b)(8)] of this title or in a permit issued under section 1344 [404] of
this title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State; ...
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by
both. If a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first
conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a
fine of not more than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of
not more than 6 years, or by both.
Id.
9. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(2)(A), 1311, 1342.
10. The Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
11. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
12. See generally Sayre, supra note 2, at 70-73.
13. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
14. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
15. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993), amended by 35 F.3d
1275, 1295 (1994) (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting). The dissent from denial of review en banc
argued that section 309(c)(2) was ambiguous as to whether "knowingly" in the statute
meant knowledge of the permit violation, or knowledge of the act that amounted to
3
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can be no better reason for Congress to restructure section
309(c)(2) to clarify just what a defendant has to know to be con-
victed of a water pollution crime under that section.
The current controversy over interpreting culpability require-
ments in federal environmental crimes requires Congress to more
clearly define mental state requirements in those statutes. One
way to provide that clarity is for Congress to begin selectively re-
drafting environmental criminal statutes using Model Penal Code
definitions and interpretative protocols. This paper uses section
309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act and the controversy surrounding
the interpretation of its mental state requirement as an illustra-
tion of one such statute that would benefit from a Model Penal
Code approach. Part II of this paper offers some basic background
in criminal law mental state concepts for those who have an inter-
est in environmental crimes, but lack a familiarity with criminal
law. Part III describes the public welfare offense doctrine as a
common law concept, its history, and its modern synthesis in the
Supreme Court today. Part IV explores the public welfare offense
doctrine in the context of water pollution crimes, beginning with
early water pollution crimes and ending with more recent case law
under the Clean Water Act. Finally, Part V explores what section
309(c)(2) would look like in a federal Model Penal Code world, and
concludes that redrafting of section 309(c)(2) under that scheme
would add clarity and certainty to its interpretation in the courts.
In using MPC protocols and definitions to amend the language of
section 309(c), this section concludes that Congress should require
the government to prove some awareness of the law under that
provision. Moreover, Congress should require the government to
prove recklessness, as defined under the MPC, with respect to
that awareness.
II. What Does "Culpability" Mean in Criminal Law?
A. What Does "Culpability" Mean in Common Law?
The "culpability" concept is deeply rooted in Anglo-American
law. 16 "Culpability" takes many different forms, and its difficulty
to define has been a thorn in the sides of both courts and commen-
the permit violation, and that the rule of lenity should apply in favor of the defend-
ants in that case. For a discussion of this case and the dissent, see infra Section IV.B.
16. See United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
[Vol. 20
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tators for the past 1,000 years. 17 The Supreme Court in United
States v. Morissette in 1952, for example, noted the various defini-
tions of culpability that have evolved over the centuries, and indi-
cated that the government is required to prove at least some
degree of mental state.18 Regardless of the confusion surrounding
degrees of culpability, the common law applies a "normative" ap-
proach to culpability, looking at the actor's moral blameworthi-
17. See RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDENER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 224-25 (1996); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 396 (1978); Wiley, supra note 1, at 1025-29; see
generally JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1947). One
commentator has distilled the history of mental state in the criminal law into five
general phases, beginning with the earliest period in which mental state was not re-
quired at all for the "government" to obtain a conviction: 1) liability without regard
for culpable state of mind; 2) willful v. accidental; 3) willful v. careless v. faultless; 4)
intentional v. reckless v. negligent v. faultless; and 5) purposeful v. knowing v. reck-
less v. negligent v. faultless. Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in
Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 825 (1980). At first, whether the act
made criminal was committed intentionally was irrelevant to establishing liability,
but may have been relevant to determining the degree of punishment. Id. ("Harms
caused faultlessly may have been punished (strict liability), yet punished less severely
than willful harms."). As time wore on and the culpability concept continued to
evolve, courts began to recognize the distinction between mere accidents and willful
conduct, between one actor's recklessness and another's negligence, and most re-
cently, between purposeful and knowing conduct. Id.
18. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251-52. Specifically, the Court stated:
The unanimity with which [courts] have adhered to the central thought
that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the
variety, disparity, and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but
elusive mental element. However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for
the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "feloni-
ous intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge,"
"fraudulent intent," "willfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge,
or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
Id. at 252; see also Robinson, supra note 17, at 815. Robinson states the Court in
Morissette "complained" of the confusion surrounding the definition of culpability, but
it seems more likely that the Court used the "variety" and "disparity" of definitions to
argue that some evidence of culpability has long been required in common law. Moris-
sette, 342 U.S. at 251-52.
The unanimity with which [courts] have adhered to the central thought
that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the
variety, disparity, and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but
elusive mental element. However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for
the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not
scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "feloni-
ous intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge,"
"fraudulent intent," "willfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge,
or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
5
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ness rather than merely whether the defendant was aware of
what he was doing. 19
Courts have created the concepts of general and specific in-
tent crimes to delineate the applicable culpability requirements in
common law statutes. A general intent crime is one in which the
mental state word in the definition of the crime relates only to the
conduct and result that comprise the offense. 20 At common law,
general intent can be inferred from the commission of the act be-
cause, generally speaking, one intends the probable consequences
of one's acts.21 On the other hand, a specific intent crime is one
that requires some special mental element beyond the mental
state required solely for the act element. 22 For example, "assault
with the intent to rape" would be a specific intent crime because it
requires proof of intent to commit an act beyond committing an
assault.23
A mistake of fact is a defense to a crime if it negates the
mental element of that crime. This makes the distinction between
general and specific intent crimes a critical one. General intent
crimes allow a mistake of fact defense if the mistake that the de-
fendant made was objectively reasonable and subjectively hon-
est.24 However, if the mistake goes to specific intent, then the
mistake need only be subjectively honest if the mistake is logically
relevant to the specific intent.25 This means that the mistake is
permitted as a defense no matter how unreasonable the defen-
19. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 81-83 (1998);
JOSHUA W. DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 132 (2d. ed. 1999)
("Broadly speaking, 'mens rea' means 'guilty mind,' 'vicious will,' 'immorality of mo-
tive,' or, simply, 'morally culpable state of mind."'); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of
Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 387-88, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL LI-
BRARY ON LAW AND LEGAL THEORY AREAS 16 (Thomas Morawetz, ed., 1991); Susan F.
Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Envi-
ronmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1204-09 (1995).
20. See DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 140 (1999); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & Aus-
TIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5 (1986).
21. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.5; see also People v. Conley, 543
N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), cited in DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 135. This state-
ment should be qualified in the context of attendant circumstances. For example,
arson is considered to be a general intent crime, and is defined as generally as "the
malicious burning of the dwelling of another." ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 216
(2d ed. 1969). "Dwelling of another" is an attendant circumstance. A defendant does
not commit arson if she burns her own dwelling. Therefore, we cannot infer intent
regarding ownership from the mere conduct of burning the building. See id.
22. See DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 140-41.
23. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
24. See id. at 172-74.
25. Id.
[Vol. 20
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dant's belief concerning the relevant facts. As a result, the gov-
ernment's only hope of obtaining a conviction at that point is to
prove the defendant was lying about his mistake.
In addition to general intent and specific intent crimes, the
common law recognizes strict liability crimes. Strict liability
crimes consist of those offenses that require no mental state with
respect to one or more act elements. 26 This category of crimes was
created to help the prosecution prove mental state where doing so
would make it unduly burdensome to obtain a conviction for some
who had clearly committed the criminal act.27 Also, these crimes
have historically consisted of misdemeanors and carried relatively
light penalties. 28 Some crimes have been labeled "true strict lia-
bility," in which the crime contains no mental state with respect to
any act element, while other strict liability crimes may apply a
mental state to some, but not other, act elements. 29 Regardless,
the utilitarian value of strict liability crimes lies in their deter-
rence of socially undesirable conduct and arguably justifies their
continued existence.30
B. What Does "Culpability" Mean under the Model Penal
Code?
In contrast to the common law, the Model Penal Code applies
a descriptive approach to defining culpability.31 The MPC, rather
than focusing on "vicious will" or an "evil mind," focuses instead
on what facts and circumstances are known to the defendant at
the time the crime was committed, regardless of whether the de-
fendant was aware of doing anything morally wrong. To carry out
the MPC descriptive approach and to clarify the confusion sur-
rounding mental state in the common law, 32 the drafters created
26. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 20, § 3.8.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 257-58 (1955).
29. Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 n.4; see also LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 20, § 3.8.
30. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 731, 738 (1960) (arguing that strict liability offenses deter socially undesirable
conduct, and that there is little evidence that strict liability offenses deter socially
desirable conduct).
31. See FLETCHER, supra note 17; see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
§ 2.02 cmt. 2 (Official Draft & Revised Comments, 1985) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL
CODE] ("In the Code's formulation, both 'purposely' and 'knowingly,' as well as 'reck-
lessly,' are meant to ask what, in fact, the defendant's mental attitude was.").
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1. Specifically, the Drafters state:
The purpose of articulating these distinctions is to advance the clarity of
draftsmanship in the delineation of the definitions of specific crimes, to
7
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four mental state words graded in order of degrees of culpability:
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. 33 One commen-
tator referred to the beneficial aspects of the MPC's culpability
definitions as a significant improvement over the past intellectual
chaos that has surrounded common law culpability. 34 As a matter
of perspective, however, the benefits may be somewhat offset by
the subtle distinctions drawn between purpose versus knowledge,
knowledge versus recklessness, and recklessness versus negli-
gence.35 The drafters of the MPC recognized that these distinc-
tions were narrow and in some cases, inconsequential for purposes
of determining liability. 36 However, the drafters also stated that
the distinctions are essential where the common law draws the
distinction between purpose and knowledge, as with some specific
intent crimes like attempt and conspiracy, and therefore are nec-
essary under a MPC regime.37
provide a distinct framework against which those definitions may be
tested, and to dispel the obscurity with which the culpability requirement
is often treated when such concepts as "general criminal intent," "mens
rea," "presumed intent," "malice," "wilfulness," "scienter" and the like
have been employed.
Id.
33. Id. § 2.02(2). A person acts "purposely" with respect to a material element of
the offense when it is his "conscious object" to engage in the prohibited conduct or
produce a certain prohibited result, or is aware of attendant circumstances or hopes
they exist. Id. § 2.02(2)(a). A person acts "knowingly" when he is aware his conduct
or that certain circumstances exist, and is aware that "it is practically certain that his
conduct" will cause a prohibited result. Id. § 2.02(2)(b). A person acts "recklessly"
when he disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element of the
offense exists or will result from his action, and disregard of that risk involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding person. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). Fi-
nally, "negligently" refers to a person who failed to perceive a "substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk" and that failure involved a gross deviation from the standard of care of a
reasonable person in the actor's situation. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02(2)(d) (Official
Draft & Revised Comments, 1985).
34. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 816.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmts. 2, 3, 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444
(holding that government's proof of knowledge, as that term is used in the MPC, is
sufficient to obtain a conviction for violation of federal anti-trust laws). Specifically,
the Supreme Court in United States Gypsum stated:
In dealing with the kinds of decisions upon which the antitrust laws fo-
cus, the concepts of recklessness and negligence have no place. Our ques-
tion instead is whether a criminal violation of the antitrust laws requires,
in addition to proof of anticompetitive effects, a demonstration that the
disputed conduct was undertaken with the "conscious object" of producing
such effects, or whether it is sufficient that the conduct is shown to have
been undertaken with knowledge that the prescribed effects would most
likely follow. While the difference between the formulations is a narrow
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/4
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At least one of the above levels of culpability must apply to
each "material element" of the crime. 38 The MPC distinguishes
between "elements of an offense" and "material elements of an of-
fense."39 An element of the offense means conduct, an attendant
circumstance, and a result of conduct that is included in the
description of the forbidden. act. It also establishes the degree of
culpability required, negatives an excuse or justification or statute
of limitations defense, or establishes jurisdiction or venue. 40 A
"material element," on the other hand, is much narrower. An ele-
ment is material when it relates solely to the harm sought to be
prevented by the law or the existence of a justification or excuse
for such conduct.4 ' Facts that relate to jurisdiction, venue, or stat-
utes of limitations are not material elements. 42
The MPC applies two important interpretative protocols de-
termining which mental state applies to a material element of a
crime.43 First, the MPC establishes "recklessness" as the default
mental state in a statute where no mental state is provided. 44
Second, when the statute does include a mental state word, that
word is presumed to apply to all material elements of the offense
unless the statute displays contrary purpose. 45 If such a contrary
purpose appears, then the default mental state of recklessness
would apply.46 This latter protocol is perhaps the more significant
of the two because it provides courts with guidance in interpreting
ambiguities in the mental state requirement depending on the
grammar and the syntax of the statute.
one, [citations omitted], we conclude that action undertaken with knowl-
edge of its probably consequences and having the requisite anticompeti-
tive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability
under the antitrust laws.
Id.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 Explanatory Note (Official Draft & Revised Com-
ments, 1985).
39. Id. § 1.13.
40. Id. § 1.13(9).
41. Id. § 1.13(10).
42. Id. § 2.02.
43. Id. § 2.02(3), (4); see generally Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element
Analysis In Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 681 (1983).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Official Draft & Revised Comments, 1985).
45. Id. § 2.02(4).
46. See id. § 2.02 cmt. 6.
9
740 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
III. Culpability: Public Welfare Offenses and
Innocent Activities
A. The Rise of the Public Welfare Offense Doctrine
Public welfare offenses have historically been defined as a
"distinct group of offenses punishable without regard to any
mental element,"47 and have their origins in strict liability crimi-
nal statutes.48 These statutes arose around the late nineteenth
and mid-twentieth centuries, and have been explained by the
changing social conditions under which the doctrine developed. 49
Cities became more crowded as urban economies soared.50 More
products were put on the shelf for personal consumption, and were
more widely distributed. 51 This new development, in turn, cre-
ated new risks to public health and welfare. 52 Despite the fact
that most of those responsible presumably lacked the intent to
cause harm, local, state and federal authorities responded by
criminalizing activities that had before then gone unrestrained. 53
By eliminating mental state from the elements of the crime, the
object of the public welfare offense statute was to deter risk-taking
and promote social betterment, rather than punish moral wrong-
47. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 67.
48. See, e.g., Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699 (1877); United States v. Balint,
258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922). See Mandiberg,
supra note 19, at 1181-88, for a thoughtful analysis of Felton and Balint, and Barber,
supra note 6, at 113, for a discussion of Behrman.
49. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 56.
50. Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 253-54. There, the Court described
in some detail the circumstances under which the public welfare offense doctrine
arose:
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to
injury from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, driven by
freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by em-
ployers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to
subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers
were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion of
cities and crowding of quarters called for health and welfare regulations
undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods became an
instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed food,
drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with reasonable stan-
dards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have engen-
dered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the
duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or
activities that affect public health, safety, or welfare.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/4
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doing in the traditional sense, as associated with thefts and vio-
lent crimes. 54
Early in its evolution, the public welfare offense doctrine was
interpreted to carry forth strict liability principles. Two fre-
quently cited examples of a public welfare offense statute impos-
ing strict liability are those at issue in United States v. Balint55
and United States v. Behrman.56 In Balint, the defendants had
been convicted of violating a statute that prohibited the sale ofsel-
ling narcotics without a permit from the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. The primary purpose of the statute was to ensure that
these sales transactions were properly taxed, while the secondary
purpose was to control the spread of drug addiction 7 Observing
the absence of any culpability requirement in the statute, the Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that the government must
prove that the defendants knew the substances they were selling
were narcotics. 58 Instead, the person dealing with the substance
must "ascertain at his peril"5 9 whether the substance falls within
the purview of the statute.60 This was seen by the Court as a mat-
54. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922); see also
Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1184 (suggesting that this approach to mens rea repre-
sented a utilitarian philosphy concerned with seeking solutions to the "overwhelming
social problems" of the period); Barber, supra note 6, at 113 (noting that the notion of
public welfare statutes as regulatory in nature designed to promote social betterment
was consistent with early English cases recognizing that the purpose of such statutes
was protection of the public rather than punishment of the individual).
55. Balint, 258 U.S. at 250; see also Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.
57, 69-70 (1910). Preceding Balint by twelve years, that case held that a statute that
made logging on state land without a permit punishable as a felony was, even without
a mental state requirement, a valid exercise of the police power. Id. Further, the
Court held that, "public policy may require that in the prohibition or punishment of
particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril
and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." Id. at 70.
56. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
57. Balint, 258 U.S. at 253.
58. Id. at 253-54.
59. Id. at 254. At least one other author has referred to this as the "at-peril doc-
trine." See e.g., Barber, supra note 6, at 113-14.
60. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254. At least one commentator has recognized that this
language in Balint could have dual meaning, with serious implications for the defen-
dant. Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1242 n.102. For example, a defendant might ar-
gue that he did not know the item was a drug, but instead thought it was sugar or
some other lawful substance. Id. According to Professor Mandiberg, Balint does not
appear to preclude this type of mistake of fact defense, though some commentators
have thought otherwise. Id. However, Balint would preclude the defendant from ar-
guing that he knew the substance was a drug, but did not know this particular drug
fell within the jurisdiction of the statute, or knew it was a drug, did not know which
drug. Id. The former would be a mistake of law while the latter would be a mistake of
fact. Id.
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ter of legislative choice to put the value and necessity of collecting
taxes, and preventing drug addiction, above the need to protect
defendants who have not committed any moral wrong in the tradi-
tional sense. 61 Similarly, a few weeks later in Behrman, the
Court sustained an indictment that alleged that a physician had
prescribed large doses of cocaine, heroin, and morphine to an ad-
dict without a permit in violation of the Narcotics Act. 62 In so
holding, the Court reasoned that if the statute did not contain a
mental state requirement, then the indictment did not have to al-
lege mental state provided the indictment was clear enough to
charge a statutory violation.63
In 1952, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to further
refine the rising concept of the public welfare offense in two cases
decided within a few weeks of one another. In Morissette v. United
States, the Court overturned the conviction of a man who had
taken spent bomb casings from a U.S. Air Force bombing range in
violation of a federal statute making it a crime to steal, embezzle
or knowingly convert government property. 64 At his trial, Moris-
sette testified that he believed the spent bomb casings were aban-
doned, and therefore he did not intend to steal them. As a result,
he argued, he could have no wrongful intent. The trial court was
unconvinced and refused to allow Morissette argue to the jury
that he acted innocently. The Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction, concluding that the statute did not expressly require
mental state as to the offense of "stealing," basing its holding in
part on United States v. Balint and United States. v. Behrman.65
The Supreme Court reversed, ultimately holding that Con-
gress' omission of mental state from the federal larceny statute
would not prevent it from imposing a mental state requirement in
the statute.66 Before coming to that holding, however, the Court
went to great lengths to crystallize the evolving public welfare of-
fense jurisprudence and contrast it with the traditional require-
ment that the government prove mental state in every crime. 67
The Court noted that two categories of criminal offenses had de-
veloped: those steeped in the common law, and public welfare of-
fenses that were created to seek some social betterment and
61. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254.
62. United States v. Berhman, 258 U.S. 280, 286.
63. Id. at 288.
64. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246.
65. Id. at 249-50,
66. Id. at 262.
67. Id. at 250-62.
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prevent risk.68 The Court characterized the federal larceny stat-
ute at issue as falling into the former category, recognizing that
states were charged with the primary role of formulating common
law crimes, and none had dispensed with mental state in lar-
ceny.69 Moreoever, common law had historically required the
prosecution to prove mental state for larceny.70 Thus, the Court
announced an early departure from the evolution of the public
welfare offense doctrine, holding that where Congress had taken a
crime from common law and failed to impose a mental state re-
quirement, the Court will presume that Congress intended to
adopt the common law mental state.71
Although Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States does not
specifically address the public welfare offense doctrine, the Court
appeared to treat the statute in that case as a public welfare of-
fense statute. The Court upheld the conviction of a hazardous
materials transport company for knowingly transporting flamma-
ble liquids in a traffic-congested tunnel in New York City in viola-
tion of a federal statute.72 The statute in that case prohibited a
68. Id. at 262. The Court, however, was cautious not to establish a bright line
rule for distinguishing between "crimes that require a mental element and crimes
that do not." Id. at 260. It further stated, "we attempt no closed definition, for the
law on the subject is neither settled nor static. The conclusion reached in the Balint
and Behrman cases has our approval and adherence for the circumstances to which it
was there applied." Morissette, 342 U.S. 246. at 260.
69. Id. at 263.
70. Id.
71. Id. Specifically, the Court stated,
[wihere Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in
the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, ab-
sence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely ac-
cepted definitions, not as a departure from them.
Id. In addition, the Court later noted that, "it is significant that we have not found,
nor has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly
eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from the common law." Id. at
265.
72. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). The Court re-
jected a due process challenge that the federal statute failed to provide adequate no-
tice. Id. at 342. The Court acknowledged that a statute must be sufficiently definite
to give notice of the required conduct, but that the ICC's regulations provided that
degree of definiteness. Id. at 340. This was in part based on the long history of the
regulation of flammable materials transport, and the trucking industry's participa-
tion in the development of those regulations. Therefore, knowledge of the regulations
would be presumed and the due process notice requirement satisfied. Id. at 341-42.
Finally, the Court noted that the statute contains a mental state requirement, elimi-
nating any due process concerns. Id. at 342.
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"knowing" violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regula-
tions governing transport of hazardous materials, 73 but the Court
did not require awareness of what the regulations demanded. 74
Instead, the Court reasoned that knowledge would be presumed
given the long history of regulation of hazardous waste transpor-
tation. 75 The disregard of that presumed knowledge and the con-
sequent harm that resulted from committing the act constituted
the punishable wrong. 76 As in Balint and Behrman, the Court
merely required awareness of engaging in conduct that made the
act unlawful. 77
Therefore, it appears that the Court in regulatory offenses
like those in Balint, Behrman, and Boyce, will not require knowl-
edge of the law to satisfy the mental state requirement in the stat-
ute. However, Morissette makes clear that where the federal
regulatory crime is taken from the common law, some mental
state is required absent congressional intent to dispense with it.
The cases that followed have produced what has been termed an
interpretative protocol for classifying federal statutes as crimes
taken from the common law, public welfare offenses or innocent
activity offenses. 78
B. A New Interpretative Paradigm
1. The Modern Public Welfare Offense
As noted above, public welfare offenses were originally re-
garded as "light police offenses" which imposed relatively lenient
73. The statute delegated rulemaking authority to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for the purpose of promulgating regulations for the safe transportation of ex-
plosives. Id. at 339 n.1. The federal statute further required that a knowing violation
of those regulations carried a maximum $10,000 fine and up to ten years imprison-
ment if death or bodily injury resulted from the regulation's violation. Boyce, 342 U.S.
at 339 n.3.
74. Id. at 342.
75. Id. at 341.
76. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1192. Professor Mandiberg attempts to syn-
thesize Morissette, Boyce, and Lambert v. United States, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), and
questions why some regulatory crimes seem to require mental state while others do
not. Professor Mandiberg suggests that one possible reason is that regulatory crimes
have a normative component, where the Court is willing to dispense with mental
state where the defendant should have known that the activity was regulated.
Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1192.
77. Boyce, 342 U.S. at 341.
78. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1213. At least one other author has re-
ferred to this development as the "rule of mandatory culpability." Wiley, supra note 1,
at 1022.
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criminal penalties. 79 Much has changed since then. Now, the
public welfare offense label has been applied primarily to statutes
prohibiting "inherently dangerous" or "uncommon" activities80
and can carry heavy fines and prison sentences.8 ' For example,
almost twenty years after the Boyce and Morissette decisions, lines
started to become clearer as to what those activities might be.
The Supreme Court issued two very similar opinions that indi-
cated that the public welfare offense doctrine would be reserved
for what the Court held were "dangerous" activities.
In United States v. Freed, the Court held that the government
did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his hand gre-
nades had not been registered under the National Firearms Act.8 2
The National Firearms Act made it unlawful for any person "to
receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him. '8 3 At
the time the statute was enacted, lower courts had only imposed a
knowledge requirement with respect to whether the weapon was a
"firearm" within the meaning of the Act. In holding that knowl-
edge was not required as to the "registration" element, the Court
relied heavily on the public welfare offense doctrine. Specifically,
the Court justified dispensing with the knowledge of the registra-
tion element by noting that the National Firearms Act was a "reg-
ulatory measure in the interest of public safety" and that hand
grenades were comparable in dangerousness to the narcotics in
Balint.8 4
Later, in United States v. International Minerals Chemical
Corp., the Supreme Court held that the "knowing" requirement in
a statute prohibiting the transportation of hazardous substances
did not require knowledge of the law, but only knowledge that the
79. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 67.
80. Staples, 511 U.S. at 606 (citing United States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp, 402 U.S. 558 (1971)) ("Typically, our cases recognizing such offenses
involve statutes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items.").
81. For example, section 309(c) of the Clean Water Act, which has been labeled a
public welfare offense statute in some circuits, imposes criminal fines of up to $50,000
per day and imprisonment for up to three years. For second convictions, fines can
reach up to $100,000 per day and six years imprisonment. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). See
also Weitzenhoff, 1 F.2d 1523. The Ninth Circuit noted, "while the Staples opinion
expresses concern with this evolution of enhanced punishments for public welfare of-
fenses, it refrains from holding that public welfare offenses may not be punished as
felonies." Id. (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 618). A discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Weitzenhoff and the dissent from denial of review en banc follows, infra.
82. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
83. Id. at 607 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1964 ed., Supp. V)).
84. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607.
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substances were hazardous.8 5 In so holding, the Court relied on
Boyce for the proposition that the dangerousness of the activity of
transporting such liquids put the defendant on notice that the ac-
tivity was regulated.8 6 The word "knowingly" in the statute per-
tained to knowledge of facts making the conduct illegal,87 and not
to knowledge of the regulation. Significantly, the Court empha-
sized that if the defendant lacked knowledge that it was shipping
dangerous acids but instead in "good faith" thought he was ship-
ping "distilled water," the person would not be covered under the
Act. 8 Therefore, although knowledge of the regulation was not
required, a mistake of fact defense as to underlying conduct was
still available to the defendant. Significantly, the Court's use of
"good faith" implies that an honest rather than a reasonable mis-
take as to the nature of the substance was sufficient to absolve the
defendant of liability.8 9
More than twenty years after Freed and International Miner-
als, the Court in Staples v. United States90 added another layer to
the public welfare offense analysis. Not only must the activity be
"dangerous," it also must be "uncommon."91 In Staples, the defen-
dant was convicted under the National Firearms Act 92 of possess-
ing an unregistered firearm. "Firearm" under the Act includes
machine guns, defined as "any weapon which shoots,... or can be
readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, with-
out manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger."93 The
defendant possessed an AR-15 rifle, which is manufactured as a
85. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 558. In this case, the defendant was
charged in an indictment for shipping sulfuric acid and hydrosulfuric acid in inter-
state commerce and with knowingly failing to show on the shipping papers the classi-
fication of the shipment as corrosive liquid. Id.
86. Id. at 565. The Court stated that, "where, as here .... dangerous or deleteri-
ous devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability or
regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or
dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation." Id.
87. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1210 (suggesting that public welfare of-
fenses are "at least superficially similar" to common law general intent crimes in re-
gard to the mental state requirement).
88. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64.
89. Id. at 563-64. The Court stated, "a person thinking in good faith that he was
shipping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid would not
be covered [under the Act]." Id.
90. Staples, 511 U.S. at 600.
91. Id. at 611; see also Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1213 (analyzing Staples' im-
pact on the construction mental state requirements in modern environmental stat-
utes such as the Clean Water Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
92. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (2000).
93. Staples, 511 U.S. at 602 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)).
[Vol. 20746
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/4
20031 SECTION 309(c) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 747
semi-automatic weapon but can be altered by its owner to fire
fully automatically. 94 Defendant's weapon had been altered in
this way. However, the defendant claimed that he did not know
that the weapon could fire automatically, and that the weapon
had never fired automatically while in his possession. 95 There-
fore, Staples claimed he should be absolved of criminal liability. 96
The government argued that it did not need to prove mental state
with regard to "firearm" because the National Firearms Act is a
public welfare offense statute.97
The Supreme Court agreed with Staples that the government
had to prove that he knew the facts making the gun a "firearm,"
and thus rejected the government's public welfare offense the-
ory.98 The Court stated that it has historically looked to the "na-
ture of the statute and the particular character of the items
regulated" to determine whether Congress' omission of a mental
state word means that the statute should be regarded as dispens-
ing with the conventional mental state requirements. 99 The Court
rejected the government's argument that all guns, not just ma-
chine guns, are dangerous and put the owner on notice that they
are subject to strict regulation. 100 The Court recognized a long
tradition of gun ownership that simply did not apply to the hand
grenades in Freed. Gun ownership is so common in the United
States, according to the Court, that to consider all guns "danger-
ous and deleterious devices" 10 1 and dispense with conventional
mental state would be to criminalize a broad range of innocent
conduct. 10 2 Therefore, it seems clear that the National Firearms
Act is a public welfare statute only to the extent that it regulates
the "uncommon" type of gun ownership involving machine guns
and other weapons defined under the Act. The dangerousness of
the activity is no longer enough after Staples.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 603.
96. Id. at 603-04. The District Court rejected the defendant's requested jury in-
struction to that effect, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the govern-
ment did not have to prove the defendant's knowledge as to the guns physical
characteristics to obtain a conviction. Id. at 604.
97. Id. at 606.
98. Staples, 511 U.S. at 608-16.
99. Id. at 607.
100. Id. at 610.
101. Id. (citing International Minerals, 401 U.S. at 565; Chemical Corp., 402 U.S.
at 565).
102. Id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
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2. Otherwise Innocent Activities
Otherwise innocent activities, or innocent activity offenses,
can be classified as all other regulatory offenses in which the de-
fendant is not handling what the court deems to be dangerous or
uncommon devices, or engaged in dangerous or uncommon activi-
ties. 10 3 Whereas culpability in public welfare offense statutes
merely requires that the defendant have knowledge of engaging in
an uncommon or dangerous activity, innocent activity offenses re-
quire that the defendant be aware of engaging in certain acts and
know that such acts violate a statute or regulation. 10 4 The only
question then becomes whether a statute regulates what would be
considered an otherwise innocent activity.
The genesis of the concept of the innocent activity offense can
be found in United States v. Liparota,10 5 where the Supreme
Court held that the government must prove that the defendant
knew that his conduct violated a statute criminalizing the unau-
thorized sale of food stamps. 10 6 In that case, Liparota was a sand-
wich shop owner in Chicago, Illinois, who had been indicted for
"knowingly" acquiring and possessing food stamps in violation of 7
U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1). 10 7 The Supreme Court held that § 2024(b)(1)
required a showing that Liparota knew his conduct to be unautho-
rized by statute or regulation. The Court in part relied on the fact
that criminal offenses lacking mental state are disfavored. Moreo-
ver, the Court relied on Morissette for the proposition that simply
103. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1199.
104. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33.
105. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
106. Id. at 403; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440
(1978), where the Court held that the antitrust laws regulated innocent conduct and
therefore required a showing of intent to create anti-competitive effects and thus vio-
late the statute. Id. at 441. Specifically, the Court stated:
The imposition of criminal liability on a corporate official, or for that mat-
ter on a corporation directly, for engaging in such conduct which only af-
ter the fact is determined to violate the statute because of anticompetitive
effects, without inquiring into the intent with which it was undertaken,
holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence.
Id. at 441.
107. The government authorizes restaurants to receive food stamps as payment for
food only in limited circumstances. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 n.2. Liparota's ar-
rest resulted from something of a sting operation. Id. at 421. Liparota bought food
stamps at a substantially lower price than face value from an undercover Department
of Agriculture agent. Id. The District Court instructed the jury that the government
must prove that Liparota knowingly acquired and the possessed the food stamps, and
the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Id. at 422-23. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting Liparota's argument that the District Court erred in failing to give a specific
intent instruction. Id. at 423.
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because Congress has not explicitly inserted a mental state word
does not mean that the Court is precluded from applying back-
ground assumptions from criminal law requiring mental state.108
The Court stated that this protocol is particularly appropriate
where eliminating mental state would "criminalize a broad range
of apparently innocent conduct."10 9 As an example, the Court
stated that a food stamp recipient would be rendered a criminal if
she used her food stamps at a store that, unknown to her, charged
higher than normal prices to food stamp program recipients. 110
The Court refused to assume that Congress would have made that
conduct illegal without some showing of mental state."'
The Court also rejected the government's argument that un-
lawfully "transferring" food stamps was a public welfare of-
fense.11 2 For perhaps the first time, the Court articulated a
modern definition of that term. The Court stated that it applied
the public welfare offense doctrine only where Congress had
criminalized conduct that "a reasonable person should know is
subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten
the community's health or safety." 3 Assuming the converse to be
true, any offense that a reasonable person would not know is sub-
ject to stringent regulation and threaten public health is not a
public welfare offense. The narcotics in Balint, the misbranded
drugs in Dotterweich, the dangerous chemicals in International
Minerals, and the hand grenades in Freed all fell within that cate-
gory, according to the Court, but not the food stamps in
Liparota.114
What about the machine guns in Staples? In that case, the
Court seemed to imply that a gun control statute that regulated
"common" guns would be considered an innocent activity offense
statute. This is, according to the Court, owing to the common-ness
of gun ownership in the United States.115 Although the govern-
ment had strenuously argued that all guns are dangerous, and
that this should therefore alert the owner to stringent regulation,
108. Id. at 426.
109. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426
110. Id.
111. Id. at 427. Moreover, the Court observed that, to the extent that Congress
was unclear on this point, the rule of lenity should apply and require the government
to prove illegality. Id.
112. Id. at 432-33.
113. Id. at 433.
114. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
115. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610-11 (1994).
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the Court appeared to suggest that the common-ness of the item
lessens the significance of its dangerousness. 116 This result would
be different, however, if the statute regulated "uncommon" guns,
like the hand grenades in Freed. In such a case, it is fairly safe to
assume that the statute would be a public welfare offense, and the
act of ownership would suffice to prove mental state. Thus, the
reasoning in both Liparota and Staples shows the primary feature
of an innocent activity as being so common and posing so small a
threat to public safety that the regulated person or entity would
not normally expect the item or activity to be subject to stringent
regulation. 1" 7
IV. Application of the Public Welfare Offense
Doctrine To Federal Environmental Crimes:
CWA Section 309(c) as an Illustration
Applying the public welfare offense doctrine to federal envi-
ronmental crimes has produced considerable controversy in an al-
ready complex area of the law. This section first traces
prosecutions of water pollution crimes from their genesis in the
early water pollution control statutes to show that those were con-
sidered mala prohibita, meaning that the government did not
have to prove mental state with respect to causing the pollution
because no mental state word was required in the statute. Sec-
ond, this section notes that the Clean Water Act today is different
in that it does contain a mental state requirement. Yet, in spite of
that requirement, courts construing section 309(c)(2)(A) have re-
lieved the government from having to prove awareness of the law,
relying in part on the public welfare offense doctrine.
A. The Rise of the CWA as a Public Welfare Offense Statute:
Mental State in Early Water Pollution Crimes
Water pollution has been made criminal in the United States
at least since the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,118 also known
116. Id. at 613.
117. This new dichotomy between the modern public welfare offense and what at
least one commentator has dubbed "innocent activity offenses" displays the highly
normative nature of the Supreme Court's culpability inquiry in federal regulatory
crimes. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1199, 1211 (suggesting that the distinction
between the regulatory public welfare offense and innocent activities indicates that
the court is faced with the same normative questions in distinguishing general and
specific intent crimes).
118. Rivers and Harbors (Refuse) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
[Vol. 20
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/4
2003] SECTION 309(c) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 751
as the Refuse Act of 1899.119 Significantly, no mental state had
ever been required in the water pollution crimes 120 until Congress
enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
1972.121 Courts construing the Rivers and Harbors Act and the
Refuse Act readily concluded that they prohibited conduct that
was malum prohibitum, and therefore did not require proof of
mental state.122 For example, in United States v. Interlake Steel
Corporation,123 the defendants challenged the sufficiency of an in-
dictment charging a violation of section 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act for failure to allege mental state. 124 Defendants had
been charged with discharging iron particles and oily substances
into the Little Calumet River. In challenging the indictment, the
defendants argued that the government was required to prove
that the defendants acted "willfully, intentionally, knowingly, or
negligently.' 1 25 The court rejected the argument, noting that
"[d]epositing refuse in navigable waters is malum prohibitum con-
stituting a violation of Section 13."126 The court concluded that in
the absence of any statutory or precedential guidance, it would not
read a mental state requirement into section 13.127 Thus, In-
terlake Steel appeared to look closely at the type of act prohibited
in determining whether proof of mental state was required.
119. 33 U.S.C. § 407. See Milne, supra note 6, at 310, for a brief overview of the
history of criminal enforcement in water pollution control statutes and Barber, supra
note 6, at 131, for an analysis of criminal sanctions under early environmental
statutes.
120. United States v. White Fuel, 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing Scow No.
36, 144 F. 932, 933 (1st Cir. 1906)); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp.
354, 356 (N.D. Ind. 1970), affd 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909
(1973); see also United States v. Ashland Oil Co., 705 F. Supp. 270, 275 (W.D. Pa.
1989); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 354 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939).
121. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
122. American Cyanamid, 354 F. Supp. at 1204 (citing United States v. Ballard Oil
Co. of Hartford, 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952)). Despite the fact that the discharges
were accidental in American Cyanamid, the Court held "[s]cienter is not required.
The offense charged is malum prohibitum." Id.; see also Barber, supra note 6, at 130.
(contending that the Refuse Act does not require mental state for corporate defend-
ants, but does for corporate officers. Unfortunately, Barber offers no support for this
contention).
123. 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
124. Interlake Steel, 297 F. Supp. at 914-15. Defendants had been charged with
discharging iron particles and oily substances into the Little Calumet River. Id. at
913.
125. Id. at 914-15.
126. Id. at 915 (footnote omitted).
127. Id.
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Two courts early in the history of modern water pollution con-
trol regulation have treated the Refuse Act and Rivers and
Harbors Act as public welfare offense statutes. 128 In United States
v. United States Steel Corporation,129 the defendants challenged
the sufficiency of an indictment charging a violation of section 13
of the Rivers and Harbors Act for failure to allege mental state. 130
The defendant steel corporation had been charged with discharg-
ing "a quantity of a red-brown particulate sediment from a drain
pipe" into the Grand Calumet River. The defendant argued that
the government should have to prove that it acted "willfully and
knowingly." The District Court rejected the argument, noting
first that the statute does not require any mental state.131 Fur-
ther, as was the case in Interlake Steel, the court rejected the ar-
gument. Depositing waste in navigable waters was malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se, and therefore could be cate-
gorized as a public welfare offense, like those referred to in
Morissette.132
In the second case, United States v. White Fuel, 33 the defen-
dant was convicted of violating the Refuse Act by inadvertently
allowing oil stored beneath its property to seep into Boston Har-
bor. On appeal, White Fuel contended that the government was
required to prove mental state with respect to the oil discharges.
The First Circuit rejected that argument, relying on the Supreme
Court's discussion of the public welfare offense doctrine in Moris-
sette for the proposition that water pollution crimes fell within
that category.' 34 The court also stressed that proof of mental
state had never been required in any case since the Refuse Act's
128. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970);
United States v. White Fuel, 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1974); accord United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229 (1966) (Harlan, J. dissenting). In Standard Oil,
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a corporate defendant who had spilled
gasoline into the St. John's River, because a narrow reading of the section 13 required
that "useful" gasoline not be considered "refuse" under that provision. Standard Oil,
384 U.S. at 229. As a result, the Court elected not to address the scienter require-
ment under section 13. Id. In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that section 13 need not
be strictly construed because "[tihe spilling of oil of any type into rivers is not some-
thing one would be likely to do whether or not it is legally proscribed by a federal
statute." Id. at 233.
129. 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
130. Id. at 356.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952)).
133. 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974).
134. United States v. White Fuel, 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1974) (quoting Moris-
sette, 342 U.S. at 255-56).
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existence. 13 5 The court speculated that this was so because the
purpose of the Refuse Act was to require people to exercise care in
not discharging refuse into waterways. 136 As a result, the court
refused to create any defense other than what was necessary to
ensure due process.' 37
Significantly, it appears that the courts in United States Steel
and White Fuel were both using the term "public welfare offense"
the way Professor Sayre used it,138 rather than the Supreme
Court's recent formulation in Staples. 39 Both courts made no ref-
erence to the dangerousness or the uncommon-ness of water pollu-
tion. Instead, both courts focused on whether the Refuse Act
contained a mental state requirement, as the Court had done with
the Narcotics Act in Balint and Behrman.140 Since the Act did not
135. Id. In addition, White Fuel argued that the government should at least have
to prove negligence, apparently hoping to assert due care as a defense. Id. at 621.
The court rejected that argument, comparing the statute to the recently enacted Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 and noted that unlike that statute,'
the Refuse Act does not draw any distinction between civil and criminal violations.
Id. at 623.
136. Id. at 623.
137. Id.
138. The court in United States Steel referred to the offense of water pollution as
malum prohibitum and therefore would fall within the category of "public welfare
offenses" that the Supreme Court described in Morrisette. United States v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354, 356 (N.D. Ind. 1970). The First Circuit in White Fuel also
quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Morissette and further noted that in the sev-
enty-five years of the Refuse Act's existence, there has never been a mental state
requirement in the statute. White Fuel, 498 F.2d at 621. The Court in Morissette in
turn refers to Sayre's article, supra note 2. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 n.7. Therefore,
it seems clear that the court in United States Steel was referring to Sayre's definition
of the term public welfare offense, rather than the Supreme Court's "dangerous" and
"uncommon" formulation.
139. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610-11.
140. A decision previous to Interlake Steel Corp. and U. S. Steel, however, muddies
the analysis somewhat by its focus on a statutory analysis of the Rivers and Harbors
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 410-426 (2000), to determine the mental state requirement, rather
than just looking for the mental state word in the statutory language. The court in
United States v. M.H. Bigan, 170 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Pa. 1959), appeared to rely
heavily on a statutory analysis of section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403, in holding that proof of mental state was not required. In that case, Bigan had
been charged with violating the Refuse Act by inadvertently depositing mining over-
burden into and along side of the Allegheny River. Bigan, 170 F. Supp. at 221. After
Bigan had been informed by the Army Engineers that he was in violation of the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act, he ceased operation. Id. at 222. A violent rain shower then
caused much of the overburden in the form of a landslide to run-off into the river. Id.
The court construed section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act as requiring some de-
gree of mental state in order for the government to obtain a conviction, id., despite the
fact that section 10 contains no mental state word, see 33 U.S.C. § 403. Bigan then
held that the same conduct violated Section 13, Bigan, 170 F. Supp. at 223, despite
that Section 13 similarly contains no mental state word, 33 U.S.C. §407. That provi-
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contain a mental state requirement, none would be imposed. At
the same time, however, the offenses at issue were misdemeanors
rather than felonies.' 41 This would perhaps explain those two
courts' willingness to apply the public welfare offense doctrine.
Professor Sayre referred to public welfare offense as carrying rela-
tively light penalties, 142 and this presumably would have included
misdemeanors. One can speculate whether these courts would
have applied the public welfare offense doctrine had the offenses
had been felonies under the Refuse Act.
B. Section 309(c) of the CWA as a Public Welfare Offense
Statute
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments, or the Clean Water Act. 143 Among other ground-
breaking provisions, the Clean Water Act (CWA) established a
new framework for criminally prosecuting a person who either
discharges without a permit or discharges in violation of her per-
mit.144 Unlike the Refuse Act or Rivers and Harbors Act, as en-
acted in 1972, the Clean Water Act contained a mental state
requirement. Section 309(c)(1) provided that any person who
"willfully or negligently" violated the Act would be subject to crim-
inal sanctions. 145 In 1987, section 309(c) was substantially
amended to provide different penalties for "knowing" and "negli-
gent" violations of the Act. As its language now reads, section
309(c)(2)(A) provides up to a $50,000 fine and 3 years imprison-
ment, or both, for "knowing" violations of the Act. 146 Central to
the debate surrounding section 309(c)(2)(A)'s status as a public
welfare offense is whether a "knowing" violation of the Act re-
sion makes it illegal to "throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be
thrown, discharged, or deposited . . . refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever .... Bigan, 170 F. Supp. at 223. While section 13 uses more passive verbs
like "suffer" and "cause" in prohibiting depositions of refuse, 33 U.S.C. § 407, section
10 uses more active phrases like "build," "excavate," and "fill" in prohibiting the ob-
struction of waterways, id. § 403. Thus, section 13 does not appear to require any
"knowing" act on the part of the defendant, while section 10's use of active verbs indi-
cating intent does appear to require the government prove mental state.
141. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (2000); see also United States v. White Fuel, 498 F.2d 619, 621
n.3 (1st Cir. 1974).
142. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 73.
143. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1972), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000).
145. 33. U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
146. Id. § 1319(c)(2)(A).
[Vol. 20754
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss2/4
2003] SECTION 309(c) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 755
quires merely awareness of facts making the discharge illegal, or
also awareness that the discharge was a violation of the law.
Perhaps one of the most notable cases holding that the CWA
is a public welfare offense statute is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Weitzenhoff.147 In that case, Weitzenhoff and
Mariani were managers at a sewage treatment plant that dis-
charged treated sewage into the Pacific Ocean near a popular
swimming area. From March 1988, the plant was facing an ac-
cumulation of waste-activated sludge, and Weitzenhoff and Mari-
ani ordered two employees to discharge the untreated sludge into
the ocean, bypassing the treatment storage tanks. As a result, the
sludge bypassed the sampling devices so that samples taken from
the treated sewage did not reflect the discharge. 148 These dis-
charges apparently took place 40 times between April 1988 and
June 1989. Perhaps not coincidentally, most of the discharges oc-
curred at night and none were reported to EPA or the Hawaii De-
partment of Health. 149 Both Weitzenhoff and Mariani were
convicted under §309(c)(2) and (c)(4) for knowingly discharging
untreated sewage in violation of the plant's permit and knowingly
falsifying monitoring reports.
On appeal, the defendants argued that the government had to
prove that Weitzenhoff and Mariani knew, in addition to facts
making the discharge illegal, also that the defendants knew that
the discharge was a violation of their permit. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the convictions on the ground that the CWA was a public
welfare offense statute, which merely required knowledge of the
facts that made the discharge a violation of the CWA, rather than
knowledge that the law prohibited the discharge.150 In so holding,
the court analogized the sewage discharges to the hazardous
materials in International Minerals'5' and noted that anyone who
knows she is dealing with such materials should be presumed to
be aware of their regulation. 5 2 The court rejected the defendants'
147. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275; see also United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000).
148. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1282.
149. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted later, in holding that the CWA was not unconsti-
tutionally vague, that Weitzenhoff and Mariani had apparently made considerable
efforts at hiding the discharges from EPA. Id. at 1289. The discharges occurred at
night, plant employees were not allowed to discuss them, and both Weitzenhoff and
Mariani lied to health officials when asked about the discharges. Id.
150. Id. at 1284.
151. 402 U.S. at 565.
152. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284.
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reliance on Liparota, reasoning simply that the food stamps in
Liparota were factually dissimilar from the sewage in
Weitzenhoff.153 Moreover, the court rejected the defendants' reli-
ance on Staples5 4 and another recently decided case, Ratzlaf v.
United States, 55 distinguishing each of them in turn.
As for Ratzlaf, the court noted that that case involved a bank-
ing regulation statute that restricted a defendant from structur-
ing financial transactions to avoid financial reporting
requirements. The court stated that, unlike Weitzenhoff and
Mariani's case, the banking regulation statute proscribed conduct
that most people would be unaware was subject to regulation. 156
As for Staples, the court stated that the Supreme Court had reaf-
firmed the vitality of the public welfare offense doctrine. 57 The
court reasoned that the CWA fell within this category of statutes
because "the dumping of sewage and other pollutants into our na-
tion's waters is precisely the type of activity that puts the dis-
charger on notice that his acts may pose a public danger." 5 8 As a
result, the government did not have to prove that Weitzenhoff and
Mariani knew their discharges were in violation of the plant's
CWA permit or the CWA itself.' 59
The denial of the defendants' request for a rehearing en banc
in Weitzenhoff produced a vigorous and lengthy dissent by several
Circuit Judges arguing that the government should have to prove
that Weitzenhoff and Mariani knew the discharges were illegal. 160
Arguing that the CWA did not qualify as a public welfare offense,
153. Id. at 1284-85.
154. 511 U.S. 600 (1991).
155. 510 U.S. 135.
156. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1285.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1286. The court compared sewage dumping to several other activities
which it deemed to be dangerous:
Like other public welfare offenses that regulate the discharge of pollu-
tants into the air, the disposal of hazardous wastes, the undocumented
shipping of acids, and the use of pesticides on our food, the improper and
excessive discharge of sewage causes cholera, hepatitis, and other serious
illnesses, and can have serious repercussions for public health and
welfare.
Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1292. Generally, the dissent was concerned that the public welfare of-
fense doctrine was leading to the dilution of the traditional requirement of mental
state in all crimes. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1292. According to the dissent, eliminat-
ing the mental state requirement in turn leads to an evisceration of the moral author-
ity of criminal law because morally "innocent" people are put in jail with violent
criminals. Id. The dissent attacked the majority's reliance on the public welfare of-
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the dissent first pointed out that elimination of the traditional
mental state requirement is generally disfavored where penalties
are excessive. 161 The dissent relied on Staples for the proposition
that where a felony is involved, it is presumed that the govern-
ment must prove that the defendant knew facts making his con-
duct illegal. 162 The key dispute between the majority and the
dissent appears to arise as to what those facts are. While the ma-
jority in Weitzenhoff believed the facts making the conduct illegal
were limited to the discharges, the dissent believed the govern-
ment should also have to prove that the defendants knew that
those discharges were permit violations. 63  Therefore, if
Weitzenhoff and Mariani did not know they were violating their
permit, then they did not know facts making the conduct illegal
and thus could not be convicted. 6 4 Moreover, the CWA criminal-
izes discharges of substances that are neither dangerous nor dele-
terious,1 65 such as hot water, rocks, and sand, because those
substances are characterized as pollutants, 166 the discharge of
which requires a permit under the CWA.167 As a result, the CWA
should not be deemed a public welfare offense statute and should
require proof that the defendants knew the discharge violated the
permit.
The dissent's reasoning in Weitzenhoff appears not to have
taken off in other circuits. Subsequent to Weitzenhoff, the Second
Circuit decided United States v. Hopkins168 and arrived at a simi-
lar result. In that case, Hopkins, manufacturing vice president at
Spirol International Corporation, was convicted of one count of fal-
sifying and tampering with a monitoring device in violation of sec-
fense doctrine as the source of the dilution of the mental state requirement in federal
crimes. Id. at 1296.
161. Id. at 1296.
162. Id. at 1297 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 618).
163. Id.
164. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1297. The dissent also addressed the panel's reliance
on International Minerals simply by noting that the crime in International Minerals
was a misdemeanor, not a felony, therefore justifying application of the public welfare
offense doctrine. Id. at 1298.
165. Id. The dissent referred to these substances as falling into the "pencils, dental
floss, and paper clips" category that the Court in International Minerals stated would
not justify elimination of a mental state requirement because they are not "danger-
ous" or "deleterious." Id.; see also International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65.
166. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
167. See id. §§ 1311, 1342.
168. United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 539 (2d Cir. 1995).
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tion 309(c)(4), 169 one count of violating Spirol's permit in violation
of section 309(c)(2)(A), and one count of conspiracy to violate sec-
tion 309(c)(2)(A) and (c)(4) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.170 Hop-
kins appealed the trial court's jury instructions that section
309(c)(2)(A) did not require the government to prove that he had
knowledge that he was violating permit conditions or the CWA. 171
The court rejected that argument, holding that section
309(c)(2)(A) did not require the government to prove knowledge of
permit conditions or the CWA to obtain a conviction. 72 Instead,
awareness of regulation is presumed. Like the Ninth Circuit in
Weitzenhoff, the Second Circuit in Hopkins based its holding on
the public welfare offense doctrine as articulated in International
Minerals.173 The court reasoned that section 309(c)(2)(A) refers to
several types of pollutants, 74 such as water quality related efflu-
ent limits, 175 toxic pollutants listed under section 307,176 oil and
hazardous substances, 77 and sewage sludge. 78 According to the
Second Circuit, the vast majority of these substances would alert a
person to the possibility of strict regulation. 179 Therefore, the
court held that section 309(c)(2)(A) is a public welfare offense stat-
ute, and the government need only prove Hopkins knew of his acts
in authorizing the discharges and committed those acts
intentionally. 180
169. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4). That provision relates to criminal sanctions for violat-
ing monitoring and reporting requirements. Id. Arguably, offenses under section
309(c)(4) do not implicate the "public welfare offense v. innocent activity" debate be-
cause those offenses involve lying, which is most likely considered mala in se when
done knowingly.
170. Spirol had just signed a consent order with the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) and paid a $30,000 fine for violating the zinc limits
in its CWA permit. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 534. To avoid the possibility of future fines,
Hopkins ordered his staff to either discard samples that did not meet the zinc limits
or dilute those samples with tap water until the limits had been met. Id. at 535. This
allowed Hopkins to file monthly discharge monitoring reports with the DEP that
showed no violations of the zinc limit, signing the same under penalty of perjury. Id.
Hopkins was convicted under sections 309(c)(2) and (4). Id. at 540-41.
171. Id. at 537.
172. Id. at 538.
173. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 558.
174. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538.
175. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000).
176. Id. § 1317.
177. Id. § 1321.
178. Id. § 1345.
179. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538.
180. Id. at 541. Moving on to the knowledge requirement in section 309(c)(4), Hop-
kins reached the same conclusion as in (c)(2)(A), holding the government did not have
to prove that he knew the CWA required accurate and truthful monitoring reports.
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Finally, in United States v. Sinskey,'18 the Eighth Circuit held
that the government did not have to prove that Sinskey, a waste-
water treatment plant manager, knew he was violating his meat-
packing company's permit when he allowed the discharge of high
levels of nitrates into a stream.' 8 2 In so holding, the court rea-
soned that "knowingly" applies to the underlying conduct pro-
scribed in the statute 8 3 and rejected the defendant's argument
that section 309(c)(2)(A) meant that the conduct prohibited in sec-
tion 309(c)(2)(A) is the violation of the permit limitation. 84 In-
stead, the permit limitation was "another layer in the nature of a
law" that applied only to the defendant's company.' 8 5 To violate
the permit limitation, the permittee must be engaged in conduct
proscribed by the permit.8 6 Therefore, the government only had
to prove that the defendant knew he had discharged a pollutant,
but not that the defendant knew the permit proscribed the
discharge. 8 7
In addition to the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wilson188 also addressed the
public welfare offense doctrine. In upholding the conviction of a
land developer, Wilson,'8 9 who filled an area of wetlands without
a permit in violation of section 404 of the CWA, the Fourth Circuit
held that the government had to prove that Wilson knew the area
Id. Although not specifically stated in the opinion, it is appropriate to infer that the
government must prove that the defendant knew he was tampering with and falsify-
ing reports. Id.
181. United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997).
182. Id. at 715-16.
183. Id. at 715.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715-16.
188. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1998).
189. Wilson was a land developer who was chief executive officer of his land devel-
opment company, Interstate General Co. Id. at 254. That Company was engaged in a
development plan of 9,100 acres in St. Charles County, Maryland, some of which the
U.S. government asserted were wetlands and therefore within the definition of "navi-
gable waters," under the CWA. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000); 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (2000). The government presented evidence that Wilson was informed
by its consulting firm that the Army Corps of Engineers may require a permit to fill
wetlands on the relevant parcels. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255. The government also
presented evidence that Interstate General continued to develop other parcels with-
out notifying the Army Corps of Engineers or making an effort to determine whether
a permit was necessary. Id. Defendants Wilson and Interstate General were charged
with and convicted on four felony counts under CWA § 309(c)(2)(A) for knowingly dis-
charging pollutants into a navigable water without a permit. Id.
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was a wetland. 190 However, the government did not have to prove
that he knew a permit was required to fill the wetland. As one of
the grounds for its holding, the Fourth Circuit pointed to the legis-
lative history behind section 309.191 Congress amended the crimi-
nal provisions of the CWA in 1987, which at the time contained
penalties for "willful or negligent" violations. 192 Congress deleted
the word "willful" and created separate penalties for negligent vio-
lations and knowing violations.1 93 Because "willful" connotes an
appreciation of illegality, Congress' choice of the term "knowingly"
indicates a Congressional intent to impose a lesser standard of
guilt.1 94 Requiring awareness of illegality, according to the Court,
would destroy the distinction that Congress apparently attempted
to draw in deleting "willful" and inserting "knowingly."195
Although the law up to this point has appeared uniform, two
subsequent developments have recently departed from the Sec-
ond, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. The Fifth Circuit in dictum
stated that the CWA is not a public welfare offense statute and
therefore the government must prove that the defendant was
aware that his actions violated the CWA.1 96 In United States v.
Ahmad, 97 the defendant was convicted of knowingly discharging
gasoline into a city sewer system in violation of section 309(c) of
the CWA. Ahmad owned and operated a gas station in Conroe,
Texas, and had discovered a leak in one of the underground tanks.
The leak was on the top of the tank and allowed water to contami-
nate the gasoline. The water sank to the bottom of the tank, and
because the gas was pumped from the bottom, Ahmad was unable
to sell gas from it. He decided to pump the contents of the tank,
some of which flowed into a manhole and ultimately to the city
sewage treatment plant. As a result, the treatment plant and two
190. Id.; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
191. The court cited two additional grounds as well. First, the court relied on
International Minerals, reasoning that the phrase "knowingly violates [several provi-
sions of the Act]" is merely "a shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions
which violate the act." Wilson, 133 F.3d at 261 (quoting International Minerals, 402
U.S. at 562). Second, the Court recognized the time honored common law maxim that
"ignorance of the law provides no defense to its violation." Id. (quoting Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)). As a result, although the defendant must be
aware of his conduct, he need not be aware that his conduct is illegal in order for the
government to obtain a conviction. Id. at 262.
192. Id.
193. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000).
194. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262.
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).
197. 101 F.3d 386.
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nearby schools had to be evacuated 1 98 The trial court convicted
Ahmad of knowingly discharging a pollutant into a navigable
water of the United States.199 Ahmad claimed that he thought he
was discharging water, not gasoline, and therefore was not aware
that he was discharging a pollutant. 200
In reversing the conviction and holding that "knowingly" in
section 309(c)(2)(A) applies to each element of the offense, the
Fifth Circuit rejected the government's argument that the CWA is
a public welfare offense requiring only awareness of facts making
the conduct illegal.20 1 In so holding, the court reasoned that al-
though gasoline is a potentially harmful or injurious item typi-
cally regulated by public welfare offense statutes, it was no more
harmful than the machine gun in Staples.20 2 The court cited
Staples for the proposition that the key to the public welfare of-
fense is "whether 'dispensing with mens rea would require the de-
fendant to have knowledge only of traditionally lawful
conduct."' 20 3 The court asserted that such was the case with the
CWA, because if knowledge is required as to whether a "pollutant"
has been discharged, then a person who honestly and reasonably
believes that she has discharged water should not be convicted of
discharging gasoline. 20 4
Ahmad's discussion of the public welfare offense doctrine
should be considered dicta. The facts did not raise a substantive
issue relating the public welfare doctrine or section 309(c)(2)(A)'s
knowledge requirement other than whether Ahmad knew he was
discharging gasoline and not water. 20 5 Thus, the decision should
have focused on whether Ahmad could assert a mistake of fact de-
fense, and whether that mistake must only be honest, as with spe-
cific intent crimes, or also be reasonable, as with general intent
crimes. If a jury could find that it was reasonable for Ahmad to
believe that he was discharging water, then he would not be con-
198. Id. at 388.
199. Id. at 389.
200. Id. at 388-89.
201. Id. at 391.
202. Id.
203. Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 618).
204. Id.
205. The Fifth Circuit in Ahmad acknowledged the only issue it faced was whether
Ahmad knew he was discharging gasoline or water, and distinguished Weitzenhoff
and Hopkins on the grounds that those cases dealt with whether section 309(c)(2)(A)
creates a mistake of law defense to what a CWA discharge permit means. Id. at 390-
91.
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victed. 20 6 The court simply did not decide whether the govern-
ment must also prove that Ahmad knew that the discharge of
gasoline violated the CWA. As one commentator has pointed out,
the Fifth Circuit's muddled discussion of the public welfare doc-
trine and its assertion that the CWA did not fall within that cate-
gory was pointless. 20 7
The second development came more recently when two mem-
bers of the Supreme Court dissented from a denial of certiorari in
a Clean Water Act "public welfare offense" case. The two mem-
bers of the Court, Justices Thomas and O'Connor, declared that
the CWA is not a public welfare offense statute.208 In Hanousek v.
United States,20 9 defendant Hanousek, a roadmaster of the White
Pass & Yukon Railroad, was convicted under section 309(c)(1) of
negligently discharging oil into Alaska's Skagway River when a
subcontractor inadvertently ruptured a high pressure oil pipeline
near the river. 210 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, fol-
lowing Weitzenhoff and holding that the CWA is a public welfare
statute. 211 As a result, the court reasoned that Hanousek could be
convicted, without violating due process, for acting with ordinary
negligence. 21 2
In their dissent from denial of certiorari, Justices Thomas and
O'Connor argued that the CWA is not a public welfare offense stat-
ute for two primary reasons. First, the CWA regulates "a broad
range of ordinary and industrial commercial activities. '" 213 Even
to the extent that the backhoe could be considered dangerous, Jus-
tice Thomas pointed to the Court's holding in Staples that some
dangerous activities are so commonplace as to fall outside the am-
206. Id. As a result, the government was required to prove that Ahmad knew he
was discharging gasoline, not solely that Ahmad knew he was discharging something.
Id.
207. See Turner, supra note 6, at 230 (noting that Ahmad could have been decided
solely on the basis of the permissibility of Ahmad's mistake-of-fact defense, and that
the Fifth's Circuit's discussion of the public welfare offense doctrine had only "clouded
an already murky area of the law.").
208. Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (Thomas J. and O'Connor J.,
dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
209. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1102 (2000).
210. Id. at 1119. Hanousek was sentenced to six months imprisonment, six
months in a halfway house, six months of supervised release, and a fine of $5,000. Id.
at 1120.
211. Id. at 1121.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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bit of the public welfare offense doctrine.214 Second, Justice
Thomas examined the penalty imposed for negligent violations in
the CWA, and noted that statutes which impose harsh penalties
generally have not been considered public welfare statutes.215
Justice Thomas concluded that courts of appeals have employed
the public welfare doctrine too readily, reasoning that simply be-
cause a statute regulates conduct known to be subject to extensive
regulation, that should not make the statute a public welfare
offense. 216
This signal from the Supreme Court is significant if for no
other reason than it may cast the reasoning of decisions such as
Wilson, Weitzenhoff, Hopkins, and Sinskey into doubt. Dangerous-
ness aside, it is fairly common for municipal sewage treatment
plants, like the one in Weitzenhoff,21 7 and manufacturers, like
Spirol in Hopkins218 and the meat packing plant in Sinskey21 9 to
discharge pollutants into navigable waters. However, it is not
clear whether the Court would consider those activities suffi-
ciently common to disregard application of the public welfare of-
fense doctrine. The relative certainty that decisions like
Weitzenhoff, Hopkins, Wilson and Sinskey have appeared to pro-
duce can be considered somewhat less reliable than previously
thought.
V. An Opportunity for Clarity: The Model Penal
Code's Definitions and Interpretative Protocols
as Applied to Section 309(c)
Until now, this note has discussed the debate surrounding the
content of "knowingly" in section 309(c)(2)(A). 220 Congress has an
214. Hanousek, 528 U.S. at 1103 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 611).
215. Id. at 1104. Interestingly, Justices Thomas and O'Connor also examined the
penalties for "knowing" violations for which Hanousek was not convicted, and con-
cluded that the seriousness of the penalties suggested that the CWA could not be con-
sidered a public welfare offense. Id.
216. Id. at 1104-05.
217. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
218. 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995).
219. 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997).
220. Not only is the public welfare offense doctrine to blame but one commentator
has noted that the Court has sometimes used MPC meanings, United States Gypsum,
438 U.S. at 444 (applying the MPC definition of "knowledge" to a statute containing
no mental state word), and sometimes common law meanings. See, for example,
Staples, 511 U.S. at 604-05 (construing statute according to background principles of
common law), for mental state words, and sometimes used MPC interpretative proto-
cols, and sometimes not. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1236.
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opportunity to wipe the slate clean and eliminate the public wel-
fare offense doctrine in federal environmental crimes by adopting
MPC definitions and interpretative protocols. These definitions
and interpretative protocols carry the promise of clarity and preci-
sion in analyzing the content of the "knowledge" requirement and
its context within the criminal provision as a whole. 221 This sec-
tion argues that Congress should redraft section 309(c)(2)(A) us-
ing MPC definitions and interpretative protocols and analyzes
how section 309(c)(2)(A) would look using that approach. This sec-
tion also offers a version of section 309(c)(2)(A) redrafted accord-
ing to MPC definitions and interpretative protocols.
Before discussing the benefits of a MPC approach, however,
three questions have to be answered: 1) Should awareness of the
law be deemed a material element of the offense? 2) How can
MPC protocols be used to clarify section 309(c)? and 3) If section
309(c) is redrafted using MPC protocols such that knowingly
would not apply to awareness of the law, what mental state would
apply?
A. Should Awareness of the Law be Considered a Material
Element of the Offense under Section 309(c)(2)(A)?
Courts that have addressed the issue of mental state with re-
spect to awareness of the law under section 309(c) have held that
the government does not have to prove awareness of the permit
violation in order to obtain a conviction under section
309(c)(2)(A). 222 However, an analysis of the reasoning of those
courts shows that Congress should overrule them in amending
section 309(c)(2)(A). For four key reasons, some mental state
should be required with respect to awareness of the permit
violation.
First, the plain language of section 309(c)(2)(A) indicates that
knowingly refers to a violation of the law. That is, the word
"knowingly" refers to "violating sections [301 and others]."223 Al-
though all the courts that have heard the argument have rejected
221. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1235 (discussing the merits of the MPC's
approach to analyzing mental state, but also recognizing its descriptive nature and
consequent departure from the normative nature of common law mens rea); see also
Robinson & Grall, supra note 43, at 757 ("This modern 'element analysis' approach
provides, for the first time, a statement of the minimum requirements for liability
that is sufficiently clear and precise to satisfy the demands of the legality principle.").
222. See supra Section III.B.
223. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (2000).
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it, it nonetheless carries some force.224 As Judge Kleinfeld pointed
out in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial of review en
banc, section 309(c)(2)(A) does not say "knowingly discharge pollu-
tants."225 Instead, it says "knowingly violates," and according to
the Judge Kleinfeld, the required state of mind should be that of
one who knows he is violating his permit.226
Second, the several courts' use of legislative history for hold-
ing that proof of knowledge of illegality is not required is not per-
suasive.227 For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Wilson stated that
Congress' decision to amend section 309(c)(2)(A)'s language from
"willfully" to "knowingly" indicated a Congressional intent to
lessen the standard of mens rea under that provision. 22 This was
because "willful" had been interpreted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Ratzlaf229 to mean "a conscious performance of
bad acts with an appreciation of their illegality."230 The inference
that the Fourth Circuit draws from this is that "knowingly" must
involve some lesser standard of guilt.231 However, the Court in
Ratzlaf also recognized that "willful" can have several meanings,
depending on the context in which the term is used.232 Congress's
use of the term in the context of a money restructuring statute, as
in Ratzlaf, may carry the same or a different meaning in the con-
text of a water pollution control statute. Moreover, the MPC uses
"knowledge" and "willfulness" synonymously by allowing that one
who has acted willfully has also acted knowingly, unless the stat-
224. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1293 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting). The dissent argued
vigorously that a plain reading of the grammar of section 309(c) indicates that some
knowledge was required to be proved with regard to the permit violation. Id.
225. Id. at 1294.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262 (noting that Congress' choice of "knowingly"
over "willfully" in the 1987 Amendments to section 309 connotes a lesser standard of
guilt); Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 539 (noting the same); Sinksey, 199 F.3d at 716 (noting the
same). The panel in Weitzenhoff used different legislative history. There, the court
noted that the history of the 1987 amendment to section 309 used the terms "causing
a violation." Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284. This, according to the panel, was evidence
that Congress intended to dispense with knowledge of illegality. Id. The dissent, on
the other hand, argued that the panel should not construe a statute that was not
enacted. Id. at 1296 ("Careful grammatical analysis might better be applied to the
law which Congress passed and the President signed.").
228. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262.
229. 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994).
230. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262 (citing Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141).
231. 133 F.3d at 262.
232. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141; see also Wiley, supra note 1, at 1120 (quoting Rat-
zlaf, 510 U.S. at 141 (noting that Ratzlafwas limited in scope because there the Court
recognized that "willful" was a "word of many meanings.")).
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ute appears to impose further requirements. 233 The drafters of
the MPC believed that this was the prevailing judicial and legisla-
tive position in a number of states. 234 Therefore, Congress's
amendments in section 309(c)(2)(A) may have been more struc-
tural than substantive, 23 5 and its use of "knowingly" over "will-
fully" is anything but conclusive of an intent to disregard
knowledge of illegality.236
Third, and more importantly, it has long been held that soci-
ety reserves the criminal justice system for those who are morally
culpable. 237 One commentator has argued that a defendant can-
not be aware of any moral wrong-doing if he reasonably but mis-
takenly believes that his permit authorizes him to discharge a
233. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (Official Draft & Revised Comments, 1985).
That provision provides:
(8) Requirement of Willfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A require-
ment that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts
knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a
purpose to impose further requirements appears.
Id.; see also Wiley, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (noting that willfulness and knowledge
are treated as the same under the MPC).
234. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9.
235. Granted, it is helpful to compare the current section 309(c) with the pre-1987
section 309(c). Before 1987, Congress housed the criminal penalty provisions in the
same provision, which created sanctions for both "willful" and "negligent" violations.
See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 539; Sinskey, 199 F.3d at 716. In
1987, Congress amended the statute to create separate provisions for "knowing" and
"negligent" violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2000). The question is whether a court
can assume, as does the Fourth Circuit in Wilson, Congress intended something dif-
ferent when it used the word "knowing" over "willful." See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262
("In changing from 'willful' to 'knowing,' we should assume that Congress intended to
effect a change in meaning.").
236. Incidentally, the Ninth Circuit in Weitzenhoff relied on different legislative
history as the Fourth Circuit had used in Wilson. 35 F.3d at 1284. The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the legislative history's use of the words "knowingly ... cause a viola-
tion" indicated that Congress intended criminal sanctions for a person who knowingly
engages in conduct which results in a permit violation. Id. This is true "regardless of
whether the polluter is cognizant of the requirements or even the existence of the
permit." Id. As a result, according to the panel, the government did not have to prove
awareness of permit violation as an element of the offense. Id. However, as noted by
the dissent, this is not the language that Congress ultimately used in drafting the
current section 309(c)(2), and therefore does not deserve the Ninth Circuit's attention.
Id. at 1296.
237. See Wiley, supra note 1, at 1022; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250. The frequently
quoted passage from Morissette follows:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose be-
tween good and evil.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
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certain amount of effluent.238 Assuming that regulatory crimes
have a retributive component, 239 it makes little sense to punish
those who have no awareness they are or even may be doing any-
thing wrong.
B. How would MPC Protocols Clarify Section 309(c)?
Assuming that awareness of the law is a material element
under section 309(c), and that the government must therefore
prove some mental state with respect to it, the next question be-
comes how the MPC protocols can help clarify the mental state
requirement in the statute. There are two ways in which the MPC
has the potential to add clarity to the interpretation of section
309(c)(2)(A). First, section 2.02(4) dictates whether knowingly ap-
plies to all or only some elements of the statute. 240 Section 2.02(4)
states that when a mental state word is provided in the statute,
that word will apply to all elements of the offense unless a con-
trary purpose plainly appears. 241 As a result, the word "know-
ingly" in section 309(c)(2)(A) would apply to all material elements
of the offense unless the provision were redrafted in a way that
displays some contrary purpose through sentence structure, syn-
tax, or grammar. Second, where the syntax and grammar of the
provision do indicate a contrary purpose and no other mental state
word is provided, section 2.02(3) provides that the default mental
state is recklessness. 242
As section 309(c)(2)(A) now reads, the government must prove
that the defendant "knowingly" violated various sections of the
Act or any permit condition. 243 Although other lower courts have
held that this means that the defendant must only engage in con-
duct and know the facts that amount to the violation,244 MPC sec-
tion 2.02(4) may produce a different reading depending on which
238. See Mandiberg, supra note 19, at 1227. Specifically, Professor Mandiberg con-
tends that "[i]f regulatory crimes have a normative basis, it is difficult to justify the
rejection of the 'permit status' defenses in cases such as Weitzenhoff, Freed, and the
hypothetical. This is so because a defendant who reasonably believes the activity is
permitted is not aware of wrongdoing." Id.
239. See id.
240. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 2.02(3).
243. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (2000).
244. See Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284; Wilson, 133 F.3d at 264; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at
715 ("To violate a permit limitation... one must engage in the conduct prohibited by
that limitation. The permit is in essence another layer of regulation in the nature of
law, in this case, a law that applies only to [the defendant]."); Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537.
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elements of the offense are deemed "material" under MPC section
1.13. For example, assuming awareness of the permit violation is
material, "knowingly" in section 309(c)(2)(A) would apply to the
defendant's awareness of the permit violation. This, combined
with the mental state word's grammatical proximity to "violate
section 1311"'245 would indicate that the government must prove
some awareness of law as part of the offense.
Applying MPC 2.02(4) to different grammatical versions of
section 309(c)(2)(A), however, "knowingly" can be placed strategi-
cally in section 309(c) to avoid applying that mental state to the
awareness of the law element. For example, section 309(c)(2)(A)
refers to a knowing violation of section 301. Section 301, in turn,
declares that "[e]xcept in compliance with [section 301,246section
402,247 and other sections 248 ] of this title, the discharge of any pol-
lutant by any person" is unlawful. 249 The knowledge requirement
could appear at the beginning of the sentence, as follows:
A person shall not knowingly, except in compliance with [section
301 and other sections], discharge any pollutant into navigable
waters. 250
Assuming that "compliance with [section 301 and other sec-
tions]" 251 is a material element of the offense, its placement imme-
diately after "knowingly" could mean that the government must
prove that the defendant was aware of the illegality of the dis-
charge. 252 On the other hand, "knowingly" could be placed after
"[e]xcept in compliance," as follows:
245. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4). Proximity of the mental state word to a
material element tends to negate any argument that Congress intended a contrary
purpose. See also Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("That is
what the statute says, 'knowingly violates,' not 'knowingly discharges."').
246. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
247. Id. § 1342.
248. Id. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, & 1344.
249. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). "Discharge of a pollutant" means "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." Id. § 1362(12). The terms
"navigable waters," "point source," and "pollutant" all have their own definitions as
well. Id. §§ 1362(7), (14), & (6), respectively.
250. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985)
(emphasis added).
251. This phrase and "awareness of permit status or violation" will be used inter-
changeably to denote general awareness of illegality.
252. An even better case could be made if the commas were removed altogether.
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A person shall not, except in compliance with [section 301 and
other sections], knowingly discharge any pollutant into naviga-
ble waters.
The syntax of this sentence could show a "contrary purpose" by
the legislature to relieve the government of its burden of proving
knowledge as to noncompliance. 253 This is because the "compli-
ance" element is separated from the "discharge" element by a
comma, and therefore knowingly would not apply.
254
C. If "Knowingly" Does Not Apply to "Compliance," then what
Mental State Does Apply?
Assuming that Congress would draft section 309(c) in a way
that "knowingly" does not apply to "compliance," the question be-
comes what mental state does apply. As noted above, section
2.02(3) of the MPC dictates that where no mental state is specified
in the statute, the default mental state is recklessness. 255 There-
fore, the government would have to prove that the defendant was
subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of violat-
ing his permit and that his disregard of that risk was a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding citizen.
256
The drafters of the MPC offer little guidance as to what would
constitute a substantial and unjustifiable risk,257 but it seems
253. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
254. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 6. The drafters of the MPC provide an
example where section 2.02(3) falls short of solving all ambiguity problems. For ex-
ample, the offense of burglary includes "one who enters a building ... with the pur-
pose to commit a crime therein. . . ." Id. § 2.02(3). One commits burglary in the
second degree if she commits the offense "in the dwelling of another at night." Id.
The drafters state that it is not clear whether purposely, which clearly applies to
"commit a crime therein," also applies to "dwelling" and "night." At the very least,
according to the drafters, "recklessness" would be the appropriate mental state. Id.
§ 2.02 cmt. 6.
255. Id. § 2.02(3). Recklessness is in turn defined as awareness of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk, the disregard of which constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct of a law-abiding citizen. Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985).
257. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 3. The drafters articulated the difficulty in defining substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk as follows:
Describing the risk as "substantial" and "unjustifiable" is not sufficient,
for these are terms of degree, and the acceptability of the risk in a given
case depends on a great many variables. Some standard is needed for
determining how substantial and how unjustifiable the risk must be in
order to warrant a finding of culpability. There is no way to state this
value judgment that does not beg the question in the last analysis; the
point is that the jury must evaluate the actor's conduct and determine
whether it should be condemned. The Code proposes, therefore, that this
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clear that this is what the Second, 258 Fourth, 259 Eighth,260 and
Ninth261 Circuits could have had in mind. For example, even if
Weitzenhoff and Mariani did not know that they were violating
their permits in Weitzenhoff, it was certainly possible that they
were aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that their ac-
tions would result in a permit violation, and that the defendants
disregarded that risk.262 The court observed that the discharges
occurred at night, that plant employees were told not to discuss
the discharges, and that Weitzenhoff and Mariani had repeatedly
denied that the discharges occurred when asked.263 It seems
clear, therefore, that even if Weitzenhoff and Mariani did not
"know" that they were violating the City of Honolulu's discharge
permit, they were certainly aware of the risk of doing so. In the
context of the MPC, one could argue that even if the two sewage
plant workers were aware of the risk of violating the permit, tak-
ing that risk was justifiable.264 Weitzenhoff and Mariani had en-
gaged in socially desirable conduct designed to prevent a worse
environmental problem: sewage flooding into the basements of re-
sidents' homes. 265 As another example, the Second Circuit might
have applied a similar analysis where it observed that an em-
ployee of the metal manufacturing plant testified that Hopkins,
the President of the Company, said "I know nothing, I see noth-
ing" when responding to his staffs efforts to adjust the plant's ef-
difficulty be accepted frankly, and that the jury be asked to measure the
substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk by asking whether its disre-
gard, given the actor's perceptions, involved a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor's situation
would observe.
Id. (emphasis in original).
258. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 533.
259. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 251.
260. Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 712.
261. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1275.
262. Id. The drafters of the Model Penal Code suggest that the jury take on two
inquiries. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3 (Official Draft and Revised Comments,
1985). The first is to look at the risk and the factors that would define its substantial-
ity, and whether, given those factors, taking the risk was justifiable. Id. The drafters
make clear that the focus of this inquiry is on the defendant's perceptions of the sub-
stantiality and justifiability of the risk. Id. Second, the jury is asked whether,
"[c] onsidering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to
him," the disregard of that risk was a "gross deviation from the standards of conduct
that a law-abiding person would have observed in the actor's situation." Id.
263. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1289.
264. Id. at 1299.
265. Id.
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fluent sampling results.266 Rather than reject the defendant's
attempt to create a mistake of law defense, 267 under a MPC re-
gime the court could have observed that Hopkins was at least
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions in
instructing his staff to discharge levels beyond the permit limits
would violate the permit.
A final example can be found in the Fourth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Wilson. 268  In that case, the government
presented evidence that Wilson was informed, by his consulting
firm, that the Army Corps of Engineers may require a permit to
fill wetlands on the relevant parcels. 269 The government also
presented evidence that Interstate General continued to develop
other parcels without notifying the Army Corps of Engineers or
making an effort to determine whether a permit was necessary.270
In light of these facts, it seems clear that Wilson was at least
aware of the risk that the law required him to obtain a permit,
even if he subjectively did not know with confidence that he was
required to do so. Moreover, a trier of fact could find that his fail-
ure to inquire as to whether a permit was required in light of his
consultant's advice makes the risk substantial and unjustifiable.
D. A Proposed Amendment to Section 309(c)(2)
Based on the principles discussed above, below is a proposed
amendment to section 309(c)(2) that may provide clarity and con-
sistency to the confusing decisions surrounding the section. The
statute establishes as material elements "discharge," "pollutant,"
and "navigable waters," and "permit violation." Moreover, dis-
charge is considered a "conduct" element, while "pollutant," "navi-
gable waters," and "permit status or violation" are considered
attendant circumstances. Thus, the government is required to
prove some degree of awareness by the defendant for each of those
circumstances.
For "discharge," "pollutant," and "navigable waters," the
amended statute retains the requirement that the government
prove the defendant's knowledge of the facts making the discharge
illegal. With regard to knowledge of permit violation, the statute
attempts to strike a balance between the time-honored maxims
266. Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 536.
267. Id. at 541.
268. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
269. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255.
270. Id.
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that ignorance of the law is no excuse 27'1 and that we only convict
the morally culpable. 272 In so doing, the statute establishes "reck-
lessness" as the default mental state for knowledge of permit vio-
lation by using grammar and syntax to separate that element
from the word "knowingly." This approach may both satisfy over-
criminalization critics concerned with convicting defendants with-
out proof of a guilty mind and environmentalists who seek to en-
sure that the government has the necessary tools to convict the
most careless and egregious violators of section 309(c).
In addition to amending the mental state requirements and
establishing material elements, each of the cross references in sec-
tion 309(c)(2) has been placed in a separate subparagraph to clar-
ify exactly which mental state is required with respect to each
element.
Proposed amended section 309(c)(2) reads as follows:
(2) A person shall not,
(A) except in compliance with section 1311, or 1345, or
permits issued under section 1342 of this title by the
Administrator or by a State, or any requirement im-
posed in a pretreatment program approved under sec-
tion 1342(a)(3) or 1342(b)(8) of this title or in a permit
issued under section 1344 of this title by the Secretary
of the Army or by a State, knowingly discharge any
pollutant into navigable waters;
(B) subject to exceptions found in section 1321(b)(3),
knowingly discharge oil or hazardous substances (i)
into or upon the navigable waters of the United States,
adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the
contiguous zone, or (ii) in connection with the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C.A. §1331 et
seq.] or the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 [33 U.S.C.A.
§1501 et seq.], or which may affect natural resources
belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive
management authority of the United States (includ-
ing resources under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C.A.
§1801 et seq.]) in such quantities as may be harmful
as determined by the President under paragraph (4)
of section 1321(b).
271. See Turner, supra note 6, at 217 (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S.
404, 411 (1833)).
272. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
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(C) for effluent limits promulgated under section 1312,
knowingly exceed those effluent limits;
(D) for national standards of performance promulgated
under section 1316, and where the person qualifies as
a the "owner or operator" of a "new source" as those
terms are defined under section 1316, knowingly vio-
late national standards of performance promulgated
under section 1316;
(E) for toxic pollutants promulgated under section 1317,
knowingly exceed those effluent limits;
(F) except in compliance with a permit issued under sec-
tion 1342, knowingly discharge pollutants from an
aquaculture project into navigable waters;
(G) except in compliance with a permit issued under sec-
tion 1342, knowingly discharge sewage sludge result-
ing from a treatment works which the person knows to
be a treatment works as defined in section 1292, into
navigable waters;
(3) A person shall not
(A) knowingly introduce into a sewer system or into a pub-
licly owned treatment works any pollutant or hazard-
ous substance which such person knows or is
practically certain could cause personal injury or prop-
erty damage or,
(B) except in compliance with all applicable Federal,
State, or local requirements or permits, knowingly
cause such treatment works to violate any effluent lim-
itation or condition of a permit which the person
knows or is practically certain to be an effluent limita-
tion or condition of the permit issued to the treatment
works under section 1342 of this title by the Adminis-
trator or a State;
Upon conviction of violations of either paragraphs (2) or (3),
the person shall be punished by fine of not less than $5,000
nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprison-
ment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a conviction
of a person is for a violation committed after a first viola-
tion of such person under this subparagraph, punishment
shall be by fine of not more than $100,000 per day of viola-
tion, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by
both.
(4) Knowing Endangerment.
(A) General rule
Any person who violates subparagraphs (2) and (3),
and knows at that time that he thereby places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
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injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of
not more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more
than 15 years, or both. A person which is an organiza-
tion shall, upon conviction of violating this subpara-
graph, be subject to a fine of not more than
$1,000,000. If a conviction of a person is for a viola-
tion committed after a first conviction of such person
under this paragraph, the maximum punishment
shall be doubled with respect to both fine and
imprisonment.
(B) Additional provisions (no change).
(5) A person who, in violation of section 1318, knowingly fails
to
(A) maintain records
(B) make reports
(C) install, use, and maintain monitoring equipment or
methods
(D) sample effluents
(E) and provide other information
is subject to the same penalties as those provided in
subparagraphs (2) and (3).
VI. Conclusion
The public welfare offense doctrine has endured a long jour-
ney, from a relatively obscure trend in the courts to a recognized
and frequently applied doctrine in federal courts today. Public
welfare offenses began as strict liability crimes in the early 20th
century and were limited primarily to petty offenses, such as li-
quor and drug sales. It was not formally defined by the Court un-
til 1985 in the Liparota decision, where the Court declared that
public welfare offenses were those which one should reasonably
expect to be subject to strict regulation and could threaten public
health and safety.273 Along the way, the public welfare offense
doctrine was applied to several criminal provisions, some with
mental state requirements and some without, as in Boyce and
Morissette, respectively. 274 Then the Court issued International
Minerals and Freed, holding that the public welfare offense doc-
trine was limited to dangerous activities. The Court in Staples
added another requirement: the activity must also be "uncommon"
273. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33.
274. See supra Section III.A.
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to justify application of the public welfare offense doctrine.27 5
How the Court moved from "petty offenses" to "dangerous" and
"uncommon" activities begs explanation beyond the scope of this
comment.
The public welfare offense doctrine has produced some contro-
versy in the context of section 309(c) of the CWA. Early on, courts
declared water pollution crimes mala prohibita, requiring no
mental state where the statute contained none. 276 Somewhat
ironically, when section 309(c) of Clean Water Act was enacted in
1972 and subsequently amended in 1987, courts continued to treat
water pollution crimes as mala prohibita in spite of clear mental
state requirements in the statute. Those courts have required
only knowledge of the acts committed, and not knowledge of the
legal significance of those acts.277
Section 309(c)(2) could benefit greatly from a revision accord-
ing to MPC definitions and interpretative protocols.278 Those defi-
nitions and protocols have the potential to help answer whether
and what mental state applies to the awareness of the law ele-
ment in section 309(c).279 In amending the language of section
309(c), Congress should require the government to prove some
awareness of the law. Moreover, Congress should require the gov-
ernment to prove recklessness, as defined under the MPC, with
respect to that awareness. It is hoped that this comment and pro-
posed amendment to section 309(c) have provided some beginning
analysis for determining how MPC definitions and protocols
would apply to that statute. By clearly labeling each material ele-
ment in section 309(c), and precisely defining what mental state
requirements apply to each element, Congress will provide the
clarity and precision needed to effectively implement section
309(c) of the Clean Water Act.
275. See supra Section III.B.
276. See supra Section IV.
277. See supra Section TV.B.
278. See supra Section V.
279. See supra Section V.
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